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Rule of Law Reform 
after Zelenskyi’s  
First Year
A Return to Business as Usual  
in Ukraine
In 2019, Volodymyr Zelenskyi won a strong mandate to fundamen-
tally change Ukraine and make it less corrupt. One year into his 
presidency, however, there have been no significant breakthroughs. 
Powerful vested interests and a lack of strategic vision have frag-
mented Zelenskyi’s leadership. Progress in rule of law reform has 
again been held up by Ukraine’s old system heavily invested in 
preserving the status quo. Western pressure and financial condi-
tionality are now the key remaining incentives for reform.
 – To bolster progress on rule of law reform, international assistance 
needs to be conditional on performance in this area. Because 
such reform is complex and takes time, the EU and other devel-
opment partners should also include reform implementation in 
their support schemes.
 – The EU needs to conduct a transparent and objective assessment 
of its assistance approach to Ukraine to encourage more effec-
tive rule of law reform. Such an evaluation could help Brussels 
and other EU capitals streamline funding for programs that work 
and make cuts to ones that have little or no impact.
 – To improve the effectiveness of EU assistance and provide 
Ukraine’s civil society with more tools to influence the course of 
reforms, the EU should employ the same assessment tools to 
measure progress on rule of law reform in Ukraine that it uses  
for its member states.
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• Rule of law reform, fundamental to the consolida-
tion of any country’s democratic future, is missing in 
Ukraine. Building independent rule of law institutions 
is a process that takes both years and coordinated ef-
forts across multiple governments to mature. While 
one political cycle or the mandate of one president is 
not sufficient for this endeavor to succeed, it can set a 
promising course.
• Ukrainians have entrusted Volodymyr Zelenskyi 
and his party, the Servant of the People, with un-
precedented legitimacy to deliver justice and free 
public institutions from corruption.
• At the beginning of their mandate in Ukraine’s pre-
mier-presidential system, President Zelenskyi and his 
parliamentary supermajority had a historic opportu-
nity to initiate sweeping reforms that would have 
been impossible to push through under the usual 
conditions of a competitive democratic system.
• A lack of strategy and long-term commitment to 
pursuing profound and sustainable rule of law re-
form resulted in half-step initiatives by President 
Zelenskyi and his team.
• While Zelenskyi’s legislative initiatives and ap-
pointments from early in his tenure set the right 
course for reforming some rule of law institutions, 
his weakness for immediate results and high ap-
proval ratings put pressure on the reformers to 
deliver or leave office – providing power groups 
interested in stifling change with opportunities for 
leveraging the political system. 
• Appointing Ruslan Ryboshapka as prosecutor 
general was a major achievement for prosecution 
reform in Ukraine. But his subsequent dismissal 
by the Rada after only seven months in office, as 
well as the president’s decision to take no action 
to protect him, is one of the biggest failures for the 
course of this institution’s reform. 
• One year into his presidency, Zelenskyi’s lead-
ership is weakened and fragmented by powerful 
financial groups interested in maintaining the sta-
tus quo. Strong vested interests have consolidated 
to put yet more brakes on reforming the rule of law. 
• Western pressure and, most importantly, the fi-
nancial conditionality of international institutions 
are the strongest safeguard of both the reform pro-
cess and progress in Ukraine.
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INTRODUCTION 
Widespread disappointment with previous pat-
terns of governance and traditional politics marred 
by corruption helped Volodymyr Zelenskyi, a polit-
ical novice, win Ukraine’s presidential elections by 
an unprecedented landslide of 73 percent of the vote 
in April 2019. In July 2019, his party, the Servant of 
the People (Sluha Narodu) – a motley collection of 
political interest groups – won parliamentary elec-
tions with the first single-party majority in mod-
ern Ukrainian history. Together, these results gave 
Zelenskyi and the country’s young prime minister, 
Oleksiy Honcharuk, almost unrestrained executive 
and parliamentary power to change Ukraine. 
For any political force freshly installed into office, the 
first few months are key for launching difficult and 
usually unpopular reforms. These then set the course 
for a new political cycle. Zelenskyi and the Honcharuk 
government took many skeptics and critics by surprise 
with the accelerated course of reform they initiated 
in a so-called turbo regime. Indeed, the reforms un-
dertaken before the March 2020 government reshuf-
fle, which replaced the government of Honcharuk with 
that of Denys Shmyhal, inspired cautious hope.
One year into Zelenskyi’s presidency, however, 
Ukrainians have not seen sufficient progress on the 
bold changes that were promised during 2019’s elec-
tion campaigns: delivering justice, standing up to 
oligarchs, strengthening the economy, and bring-
ing peace to Donbas (Figure 1). While Zelenskyi has 
pushed forward legislative initiatives and appoint-
ments that have set an initial course for rule of law 
reform, his lack of clear strategy and commitment – 
coupled with his weakness for pursuing immediate 
results – were exploited by strong vested interests 
that again quashed headway.
Although some positive achievements were made, 
judicial reform is currently stalled and undermined 
from within. The clean-up of the country’s prosecu-
tion was interrupted. Anti-corruption agencies are 
under attack where they work. Reform of the Na-
tional Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has not even 
begun while other law enforcement agencies need 
further work. High-level convictions have yet to take 
place. The old guard’s power to stifle change accord-
ing to its interests is again increasing at the expense 
of the government’s capacity to defend the values 
and institutions of the rule of law, which are at the 
heart of Ukraine’s process to consolidate its demo-
cratic transformation.
Moreover, reforming the rule of law is a complex 
endeavor that needs to be backed by bold political 
leadership and strong administrative capacity. In 
order for such reforms to consolidate, it takes de-
cades, multiple governments, coordinated effort, 
and a widespread pro-reform consensus among ma-
jor stakeholders. The reshuffle of the Ukrainian gov-
ernment on March 4, 2020 – just as the country was 
plunging into the COVID-19 pandemic – was a turn-
ing point for President Zelenskyi and national poli-
tics, marking the beginning of a deep crisis both in 
the president’s team and his political party. The de-
velopments around the fragmentation of Zelenskyi’s 
political leadership, together with the government’s 
weakened capacity to protect institutions and re-
forms, create unfavorable ground for further prog-
ress on genuine and sustainable reforms.
In order to understand what the international com-
munity can expect from the remainder of President 
ACRONYMS
BFI Bureau of Financial Investigations 
CIE Commission on Integrity and Ethics 
CC Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
HACC High Anti-Corruption Court 
HCJ High Council of Justice 
HQCJ High Qualification Commission  
 of Judges of Ukraine 
KDAC Kyiv District Administrative Court 
NABU National Anti-Corruption Bureau 
NAPC National Agency for the Prevention  
 of Corruption 
OPG Office of the Prosecutor General 
PGO Prosecutor General’s Office 
SAPO Specialized Anti-Corruption  
 Prosecutor’s Office 
SBI State Bureau of Investigations 
SC Supreme Court of Ukraine 
SBU National Security Service of Ukraine 
SGUA EU’s Support Group for Ukraine 
VLAP Visa Liberalization Action Plan
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Zelenskyi’s political mandate in the rule of law area, 
this paper analyzes the major initiatives undertaken 
within the first year of his tenure in regard to the ju-
diciary, prosecution, anti-corruption institutions, and 
key law enforcement agencies. It also provides a list of 
recommendations for the EU and its member states on 
how to help Ukraine consolidate its rule of law.1
DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL 
CONTEXT FOR RULE 
OF LAW REFORM
The Revolution of Dignity in 2014 raised Ukraini-
ans’ hopes and expectations for the consolidation of 
their country’s European future within a new polit-
1 This paper borrows from the European Commission’s definition of the rule of law. It states that all members of a society, including those in government 
and parliament, are equally subject to the law and the control of independent courts – irrespective of the political majorities in office. Consequently, states 
require independent and accountable institutions of justice, prosecution, anti-corruption, and law enforcement. 
ical and economic order. Since that time, the coun-
try has embarked on a strenuous path of reforms 
supported by its international partners, most im-
portantly the European Union and the International 
Monetary Fund. Consequently, Ukraine has achieved 
important results over the last five years, which 
were only possible due to the strong pressure ap-
plied domestically by reform-minded actors and in-
ternationally by the conditionality mechanisms of its 
partners – the so-called “sandwich effect.”
Increased Domestic Demand for Reform 
Progress on rule of law in Ukraine, however, has 
not been systematic. Indeed, important system-
ic problems remain that affect the country’s dem-
FIGURE 1 – EVALUATION OF THE SUCCESS OF VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYI‘S FIRST YEAR  
IN OFFICE, IN %
Reducing the  
level of corruption 
among officials
Prosecution of  
representatives  
of the previous  
government for  
corruption
Ending the war,  
settlement of the  
conflict in Donbas
Countering the  
economic crisis
SUCCESSFUL
NOT SUCCESSFUL
HARD TO SAY/  
DON‘T KNOW
26
21 21
16
66
69 64
73
9
10 15
12
Source: “One Year of President Zelensky, Fighting the Coronavirus Pandemic, May Holidays and Political Ratings,” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology,
May 19, 2020: <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=945&page=1> (accessed May 25, 2020).
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ocratic transformation. In particular, strong vested 
interests, weak rule of law institutions, and endemic 
corruption (Figure 2) still seriously affect Ukraine’s 
economy, governance, and society. These challenges 
directly impact the volume of foreign direct invest-
ment entering the country. Investors are unwilling to 
invest when poor institutions encourage corruption, 
nepotism, and red tape that all increase the costs of 
doing business.2 Moreover, weak rule of law erodes 
democratic governance. It also impacts the level of 
trust that citizens have in political institutions. 
These poorly addressed grievances propelled 
Volodymyr Zelenskyi to the fore of Ukrainian politics 
in 2019’s national elections. Yet, if in early autumn 
2019, his unprecedented societal support coupled 
with a united political force in parliament helped 
the president easily push reformist legislative acts 
through the Verkhovna Rada, this momentum is now 
over. In November 2019, against the background of 
lack of progress on either Donbas or domestic re-
forms, Zelenskyi’s high popular support started fad-
ing away, hitting a new low this April (Figures 3A and 
3B) despite the March government reshuffle meant 
to stop its decline. Currently, however, the president 
is still the political figure whom Ukrainians most 
trust. Only 32 percent of respondents to a recent poll 
do not trust Zelenskyi; all other political actors have 
higher levels of distrust (Figure 4). As of May 2020, 
the president’s party, Servant of the People (SoP), al-
so remains the dominant political force (Figure 5). 
It is, however, deeply fragmented and heavily influ-
enced by strong political and economic groups with 
high stakes in the course of reforms. In 70 percent of 
the voting in the Rada in March, SoP lacked the nec-
essary amount of votes within the party to pass laws. 
In fact, out of 25 laws adopted, only 7 of them were 
passed with sufficient votes from the SoP alone.3 
With his party in crisis, President Zelenskyi’s ca-
pacity to push forward his reform agenda is further 
undermined. 
The International Context:  
An Opportunity and a Hindrance for Reform
Against the background of stalled progress on both 
conflict settlement in Donbas and domestic reforms, 
2 Bonnie G. Buchanan et al., “Foreign Direct Investment and Institutional Quality: Some Empirical Evidence,” International Review of Financial Analysis  
21 (2012), pp. 81–89.
3 Committee of Voters of Ukraine, “Mono-majority failed supporting the voting in 70% of legal acts passed by the Rada,” KVU News, March 31, 2020: 
<http://www.cvu.org.ua/nodes/view/type:news/slug:monobilshist-provalyla-holosuvannia-za-70-ostannikhrishen-rady-kvu> (accessed May 1, 2020).
4 “Remarks by Commissioner Várhelyi at a press conference with Prime Minister of Ukraine, Oleksiy Honcharuk,” European Commission, February 12, 2020: 
<https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/varhelyi/announcements/remarks-commissioner-varhelyi-press-conference-prime-minister-
ukraine-oleksiy-honcharuk_en> (accessed May 3, 2020). 
5 “Statement by the IMF Managing Director on Ukraine,” Press Release no. 19/446, International Monetary Fund, December 7, 2019:  
<https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2019/12/07/PR19446-Statement-by-the-IMF-Managing-Director-on-Ukraine> (accessed May 3, 2020).
Ukraine was close to losing the attention of the in-
ternational community. The unexpected and over-
whelming electoral support that President Zelenskyi 
and his party received in 2019, however, gave the EU, 
its member states, and other international partners 
cautious hope for renewed momentum. While de-
velopment partners had previously paid particular 
attention to supporting Ukraine’s fight against cor-
ruption, there is now a window of opportunity to 
broaden their interest into wider progress on the 
rule of law.
During a two-day visit to Ukraine this February, 
Oliver Varhelyi, the EU’s Commissioner for Neigh-
borhood and Enlargement, stated that he wants to 
bring relations between Ukraine and the EU to a 
new level. He said that the EU will continue its sup-
port for good governance and rule of law reforms in 
Ukraine, as well as prioritize boosting the Ukrainian 
economy.4 Moreover, in her statement on Ukraine in 
December 2019, IMF managing director Kristalina 
Georgieva said that, following a telephone conversa-
tion with Zelenskyi, they both agreed that “Ukraine’s 
economic success depends crucially on strengthen-
ing the rule of law, enhancing the integrity of the ju-
diciary, and reducing the role of vested interests in 
the economy,” among other important reforms.5
Because of strong societal support for Ukraine’s Eu-
ropean future, the EU and other international part-
ners, such as the IMF, have always been influential 
for Ukraine’s course of reforms. Moreover, their con-
ditionality mechanisms came in handy for help-
ing to pass difficult reforms when domestic political 
will was insufficient. Given the uncertainty resulting 
from the COVID-19 pandemic and its economic af-
termath – alongside shifting priorities resulting from 
multiple crises that the EU is managing both inter-
nally and at its external borders – it will be a chal-
lenge for Ukraine to remain a priority on the agendas 
of its development partners. This also means that 
the pressure for difficult reforms may remain mostly 
on the shoulders of the country’s own pro-reformist 
constituencies.
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NATIONAL POLICE
This police force ensures 
public safety and order and 
is responsible for protect-
ing human rights and the 
interests of society and the 
state. It also investigates 
and prevents crime.
REGIONAL  
PROSECUTION OFFICES:
• 24 regional offices
• Prosecutor’s Office AR Crimea and  
the City of Sevastopol
• Prosecutor’s Office of the  
City of Kyiv
HIGH COURT ON  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
30 MEMBERS
HIGH ANTI- 
CORRUPTION COURT 
(HACC): 39 MEMBERS
Cases concerning corrup-
tion in Ukraine that caused 
damages equivalent to at 
least $31 thousand are to 
be brought directly to this 
court. Appeals are consid-
ered by the HACC’s  
separate Appeal  
Chamber.
NATIONAL AGENCY  
FOR PREVENTION OF  
CORRUPTION (NAPC)
It shapes and implements 
anti-corruption policy while 
creating an environment 
conducive to the prevention 
of corruption that includes 
the electronic declaration 
of assets.
NATIONAL ANTI- 
CORRUPTION BUREAU  
OF UKRAINE (NABU) 
Charged with investigating 
corruption in Ukraine and 
preparing cases for prose-
cution, it has investigatory 
powers but cannot indict 
suspects. For its findings to 
become part of a criminal 
case, they must be  
passed to SAPO.
NATIONAL SECURITY  
SERVICE OF UKRAINE (SBU) 
Although it now focuses 
on counterintelligence and 
combating terrorism, it still 
includes a department for 
the investigation of  
economic crimes  
(Department K).
STATE BUREAU OF  
INVESTIGATIONS (SBI) 
It deals with crimes  
(excluding corruption)  
by high-level officials,  
employees of law enforce-
ment authorities, the police, 
and the prosecution. 
BUREAU OF  
FINANCIAL INVESTI- 
GATIONS (BFI) 
Legislation to create this
special forensic bureau for
financial crimes has not yet
been enacted. The president
is currently developing a
new bill that he will then 
submit to the
Rada.
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Among their other  
functions, all mentioned 
institutions have pre-trial 
investigative functions.
PUBLIC PROSECUTION
This criminal justice  
authority ensures that 
laws are observed in  
two areas:
• By authorities carrying 
out detective operations, 
inquiries, and pre-trial 
investigation; 
• In the enforcement of 
court judgments delivered 
in criminal cases.
It also supports the pros-
ecution in court on behalf 
of the state.
THE JUDICIAL
SYSTEM OF
COURTS
AUTHORITIES TO  
PREVENT AND 
FIGHT HIGH-LEVEL  
CORRUPTION
DISTRICT  
PROSECUTION  
OFFICES
APPELATE  
ECONOMIC 
COURTS:  
7 COURTS
DISTRICT  
ECONOMIC 
COURTS:  
27 COURTS
APPELATE  
ADMINISTRA-
TIVE COURTS:  
8 COURTS
DISTRICT  
ADMINISTRA-
TIVE COURTS: 
27 COURTS
APPELATE  
GENERAL 
COURTS:  
26 COURTS
DISTRICT   
GENERAL 
COURTS: 280 
COURTS
UKRAINE’S INSTITUTIONAL SETTING FOR RULE OF LAW
SELF-GOVERNING  
JUDICIAL BODIES
• Assembly of Judges: 300+ delegates
• Council of Judges: 33 members
• High Council of Justice: 21 members
• High Qualification Committee of  
Judges: 12 seats, 0 of which are  
currently filled
Source: Authors’ compilation of data as of May 1, 2020 from the legislation on all respective institutions and their institutional websites. 
Special  
Prosecution  
on Military 
Crimes and 
Crimes in the 
Military  
Industry
Special  
Anti-Corruption 
Prosecutor’s  
Office (SAPO)
OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR 
GENERAL: 1,500 
employees
SUPREME COURT: 4 COURTS WITH  
A TOTAL OF 193 MEMBERS 
(administrative, commercial,  
criminal, and civic)
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT:  
18 MEMBERS
It asesses whether the legislative acts of the parliament, 
president, cabinet, and Crimean Parliament are in line 
with Ukraine’s constitution.
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RULE OF LAW REFORM DURING 
ZELENSKYI’S PRESIDENCY SO FAR
Zelenskyi’s campaign promise to get rid of corrup-
tion could not be fulfilled without addressing rule 
of law issues. When he became president, he prom-
ised to initiate long-awaited reforms in the judiciary, 
prosecution, security sector, and other law enforce-
ment agencies that would strengthen the fundamen-
tals of Ukraine’s democratic transformation. With 
very few exceptions,6 however, the rule of law re-
forms initiated so far have hardly produced any tan-
gible results. The following sections analyze the main 
changes that have been undertaken in these areas to 
gauge expectations for further reform progress in 
the remaining years of Zelenskyi’s tenure. 
Petro Poroshenko’s Legacy:  
Rule of Law Reforms from 2014 to 2018 
We cannot assess the impact of Zelenskyi’s proposed 
solutions in this field unless we first understand the 
institutional challenges and problems he inherited 
from his direct predecessor, Petro Poroshenko who 
served as Ukraine’s president from 2014 to 2019. 
Upon his election one year ago, Zelenskyi took over 
both new and old rule of law institutions, most of 
which were weak. Before we explore them, howev-
er, we must mention the change of the constitutional 
balance of powers in Ukraine after 2014’s Revolution 
of Dignity that helps explain how much of the suc-
cesses and failures in rule of law reform can be at-
6 In October 2019, Ukrainian lawmakers reinstated criminal liability for illegal enrichment of government officials after the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
overturned the previous law on illicit enrichment in February 2019 just before Petro Poroshenko left office.
tributed to the country’s presidents. The change 
restored the premier-presidential system of 2004, 
which helps prevent the concentration of political 
power in the sole hands of the president and makes 
the prime minister’s powers nearly as strong. Hence, 
the institution of the presidency is not currently as 
powerful as it used to be during the eras of Leonid 
Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovych, who served as the 
country’s presidents from 1994 to 2004 and 2010 to 
2014, respectively. Still, in the current system of gov-
ernance, the president is the commander in chief of 
the armed forces, has sole authority over the SBU, 
and retains sufficient control over the office of the 
prosecutor general (OPG), the judiciary, and law- 
enforcement bodies. In addition, many informal tools 
are left in the president’s hands, which also create 
important power imbalances in his favor. 
Although during Poroshenko’s presidency author-
ities undertook the boldest rule of law reforms to 
increase transparency and limit opportunities for 
corrupt practices since Ukraine’s independence, 
these were patchy and suffered from many deficien-
cies (see page 11). Thus, Zelenskyi inherited most-
ly weak rule of law institutions and key unsolved 
problems from the country’s old system were passed 
on, among them corruption, nepotism, and politi-
cal influence over judges, prosecutors, and law en-
forcement authorities. Moreover, the power of the 
country’s entrenched vested interests was mere-
ly reshuffled and continued unabated. Most impor-
tantly, reforms failed to bring policy-makers and 
officials who abused their public offices to justice – 
FIGURE 2 – RULE OF LAW AND CONTROL OF CORRUPTION IN UKRAINE, 2004–2018
Source: World Bank, World Governance Indicators, 2019
Note: Estimate gives the country’s score on the aggregate indicator, ranging from -2.5 (low) to 2.5 (high).
2004 2006
Control of Corruption Rule of Law
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1.00
1.50
0.50
0.00
-0.50
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a fact that has angered many Ukrainians for whom 
high-level convictions are a key performance indi-
cator. This has led to the persistence of the public’s 
perception that rule of law institutions are amongst 
the most corrupt in Ukraine. The very low levels of 
trust are reflective of this situation (Figure 6).7 
The Judiciary: Resilient to Reform
Because Ukrainians perceived the judicial system and 
law enforcement agencies to be the main pillars of 
former President Yanukovych’s authoritarian regime, 
seeking justice has been one of their key priorities. 
During the Revolution of Dignity, both institutions 
played a key role in legalizing the old regime’s crimes 
such as the prosecution and jailing of protesters. But 
when citizens demanded that the system be purged 
of the judges who were dependent on politicians and 
oligarchs,8 the Ukrainian judiciary has again proven 
resistant to change. As a result, President Zelenskyi 
inherited an unreformed judiciary, which was most-
ly dominated by the interests of the old system. Ma-
ny of Ukraine’s judges also were part of this system, 
hence reinforcing it. 
7 “2019 Results and 2020 Forecasts: Public Opinion,” Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the Razumkov Centre, December 26, 2019:  
<https://dif.org.ua/article/pidsumki-2019-gromadska-dumka> (accessed April 5, 2020).
8 Olena Makarenko, “Five years after Euromaidan, 227 judges who persecuted activists keep their seats,” Euromaidan Press, February 26, 2019: <http://
euromaidanpress.com/2019/02/26/five-years-after-euromaidan-227-judges-who-persecuted-activists-keep-their-seats/> (accessed April 30, 2020). 
9 “New Justice System: Manifesto,” DEJURE Foundation: <https://en.dejure.foundation/manifesto> (accessed April 30, 2020).
10 Iryna Shyba, “Project ‘New Leaders’” [in Ukrainian], Democracy Justice Reforms (DEJURE), 2019: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c-
JRaoOVEs0mlDDy2E0V75_Quo2lUZw9/view> (accessed April 30, 2020).
Indeed, according to an assessment by the Ukrainian 
DEJURE Foundation in 2019, “the courts have failed 
to gain meaningful independence – independent 
judges continue to be pressured, while others con-
tinue to be used for political purposes. Despite the 
introduction of a constitutional amendment re-
quiring a competitive selection process to the Con-
stitutional Court, the process remains politically 
motivated…”9
Following constitutional amendments in 2016, the 
authority to appoint judges was transferred from 
parliament to the High Council of Justice (HCJ), a 
key body conceived to be self-governing and auton-
omous from the rest of the judiciary, as well as the 
legislative and executive branches. Together with 
the High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ), 
the HCJ was given the responsibility to reform the 
system from within. As the culmination of this pro-
cess – after a qualification assessment of 2,038 judg-
es in 2019 that was intended to be rigorous – the HCJ 
dismissed only 15 judges from the system. Five years 
after the revolution, 227 of the 337 judges who pros-
ecuted activists maintained their seats.10 Moreover, 
44 of the 193 judges appointed to the new Supreme 
FIGURE 3A – COMPARATIVE APPROVAL RATINGS OF DECIDED VOTERS, IN % 
Source: Authors’ compilation of data from Kyiv International Institute of Sociology for Feb 2019, Feb 2020, and Apr 2020 (accessed May 5, 2020).
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RULE OF LAW REFORMS 
FROM 2015 TO 2017
Between 2015 and 2017, Ukraine’s reformers 
worked intently to establish new formal 
structures and processes to expose, investigate, 
and prosecute high-level corruption. Among the 
most important institutions to result from this 
work were the National Agency for Prevention of 
Corruption (NAPC), the Special Anti-Corruption 
Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO), the State Bureau of 
Investigation (SBI), the National Anti-Corruption 
Bureau of Ukraine (NABU), and the High Anti- 
Corruption Court (HACC). 
The NAPC has not gained credibility; rather, 
it has been a source of controversy since its 
establishment. Confronted by allegations that 
its leadership is not politically independent and 
that it sabotaged the process for verifying the 
asset declarations of state and local government 
officials, the NAPC was in dire need of a complete 
organizational re-boot and new top leadership. 
The reputation of the SAPO was damaged by 
the revelation that its head, Nazar Kholodnitsky, 
used undue influence to sway the outcome of 
an investigation. The SBI, which was created to 
deal with the crimes committed by top officials, 
law enforcers, military officers, and judges, 
failed to bring new blood into the system with a 
compromised recruitment process for its senior 
leadership. The reform of the OPG has also been 
thin; because having a loyal individual in the 
country’s top investigative position has always 
been important for Ukraine’s heads of state, 
genuine reform was never a priority.
In 2016, judicial reform advanced with the cre-
ation of a new Supreme Court and the reduction 
of the number and levels of courts from four to 
three. Also, a new electronic asset declaration 
system was introduced, which obliged officials to 
declare all assets they possess inside and outside 
Ukraine, as well as all assets officially registered 
in the name of their relatives. Although the need 
to comply with this policy made more than 2,000 
judges voluntarily leave their positions, and thus 
brought fresh cadres to the system, this was not 
enough to significantly remedy the judiciary. The 
recruitment process for the new Supreme Court, 
which ended in late 2017, was only partially 
transparent. With nearly 80 percent of the 
newly appointed judges having been part of the 
previous system, there is little evidence to show 
that the new Supreme Court has now started to 
be fully independent or started to avoid exerting 
any undue political influence. The clean up of 
Ukraine’s lower courts also appears to have been 
superficial. 
The establishment of an independent NABU 
through a legal setup that ensures its institu-
tional independence and a rigorous recruitment 
process was one of the main successes that 
was achieved during this same period. While its 
independence and subsequent achievements 
have attracted numerous attacks, NABU’s great-
est challenge during Poroshenko’s presidency 
was the lack of a properly functioning judiciary 
able to independently try its cases.
Alongside preserving an independently 
functioning SAPO, saving institutions such as 
NABU from power groups interested in retaining 
their monopoly on law enforcement and justice 
also required the creation of an independent 
anti-corruption court (HACC). While HACC was 
established during Poroshenko’s presidency 
under heavy pressure from international partners 
and its rigorous recruitment process of judges 
ended in April 2019, this new court only started 
working in September 2019.
With the exception of the patrol police, there has 
been no significant reform of law enforcement 
agencies. The proposal to limit the powers of the 
National Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), has 
failed, as have efforts to have it overseen by a 
specialized parliamentary committee.
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Court also have integrity issues.11 There is further ev-
idence that the HCJ exercises pressure over inde-
pendent judges via disciplinary investigations.12
Zelenskyi raised a lot of hopes for the reform of 
Ukraine’s limping judicial system when, in Novem-
ber 2019, he put forward a law meant to improve the 
system’s weakest points.13 Among the major changes 
the law proposed was the overhaul of the HQCJ, in-
cluding setting up competitive selection procedures 
for its members. The HQCJ is in charge of select-
ing judges and conducting their assessment as well 
as recommending judges to the HCJ for their subse-
quent appointment or transfer. The law also estab-
lished a separate Commission on Integrity and Ethics 
with the power to cleanse both the HQCJ and HCJ. 
Further, it reduced the number of Supreme Court 
judges from 200 to 100. 
The law, however, contained significant flaws and 
was only partially supported by civil society. Ideally, 
the reform of the HQCJ and creation of the Commis-
11 Olena Makarenko, “Judicial reform 2.0: Zelenskyy comes with initiatives only partly supported by society,” Euromaidan Press, September 4, 2019: <http://
euromaidanpress.com/2019/09/04/judicial-reform-2-0-zelenskyy-comes-with-initiatives-only-partly-supported-by-society/> (accessed April 30, 2020).
12 Iryna Shyba, “Project ‘New Leaders’” [in Ukrainian], Democracy Justice Reforms (DEJURE), 2019: <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1c-
JRaoOVEs0mlDDy2E0V75_Quo2lUZw9/view> (accessed April 30, 2020).
13 The Law of Ukraine “On Amending the Law of Ukraine ‘On Judiciary and the Status of Judges’ and other Laws of Ukraine on Functioning of Judicial 
Governing Bodies,” Document 193-IX, adopted October 16, 2019 (came into force November 6, 2019): <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/193-20> 
(accessed May 5, 2020).
14 Mykhailo Zhernakov, “Judicial Reform in Ukraine: Stalled, Damaged, and Abandoned,” 3 DCFTAs, Op-ed No. 11/2020 (April 2020): <https://3dcftas.eu/
op-eds/judicial-reform-in-ukraine-stalled-damaged-and-abandoned> (accessed May 1, 2020).
15 “The High Council of Justice blocks judicial reform” [in Ukrainian], DEJURE Foundation, November 22, 2019: <https://dejure.foundation/news/vyscha-
rada-pravosuddia-blokue-sudovu-reformu> (accessed May 1, 2020).
16 “The HCJ blames international partners for blocking the judicial reform,” DEJURE Foundation, February 12, 2020: <http://en.dejure.foundation/news/hcj-
sion on Integrity and Ethics would have resulted in 
ensuring the high institutional integrity of the HQCJ 
and HCJ as two self-governing bodies of the judicia-
ry. In reality, however, the law gave too much pow-
er over the process to the HCJ, which itself was in 
bad need of renewal.14 The law’s implementation re-
vealed exactly this problem as the HCJ subsequently 
blocked its progress. In December 2019, for exam-
ple, when the HCJ adopted the rules for selecting 
new HQCJ members, it watered down the role that 
international experts were to play in the process of 
ensuring their integrity. While the participation of 
international experts had been considered to have 
been a move in the right direction, the current form 
of the regulations still allows for the appointment of 
HQCJ members who lack integrity. Moreover, the 
February 2020 deadline for completing the setup of 
the new HQCJ and ethics commission was missed. 
Ukrainian anti-corruption activists accused the HCJ 
of intentionally sabotaging and delaying judicial re-
form15 while the latter blamed international organi-
zations instead.16
FIGURE 3B – ATTITUDES TOWARD VOLODYMYR ZELENSKYI‘S POLICIES, IN % 
Source: “Assessment of Government Success and Public Response to the Coronavirus Epidemic and Political Developments in the Country,”  
Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, April 14, 2020
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In addition, the law’s stipulation to halve the number 
of Supreme Court judges was controversial from the 
outset. Although Ukraine’s Supreme Court is unable 
to process all of the cases it receives – as of January 
2020, there was backlog of 50,000 – some consid-
er the 193 judges currently serving on that court to 
be an unjustified luxury, given that local-level courts 
are understaffed and fail to rule on basic but import-
ant cases for ordinary citizens. Independent legal 
experts from the DEJURE Foundation, on the other 
hand, calculated that 198 judges would be an appro-
priate number to have on the Supreme Court for the 
next three years with possible revision after that.17 
The Venice Commission also criticized the law’s pro-
visions for failing to specify procedures for selecting 
a new Supreme Court. According to its issued opin-
ion, the lack of such procedures might lead to the 
politicization of the selection process, for example, 
blames-int-partners-for-blocking-judicial-reform> (accessed May 1, 2020).
17 “200 vs 100: how many judges are needed in the Supreme Court” [in Ukrainian], DEJURE Foundation, January 30, 2020: <https://dejure.foundation/
newsroom/200vs100-skilky-suddiv-potribno-u-verkhovnomu-sudi> (accessed May 1, 2020).
18 Opinion of the Venice Commission, “Ukraine. Law No. 193 of Ukraine ‘On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine Regarding Activity of Judicial 
Governance Bodies’ and Explanatory Note,” Opinion No. 969/2019, November 20, 2019: <https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-
REF(2019)039-e> (accessed May 1, 2020).
19 “Judgement on the Case of the Supreme Court’s Constitutional Appeal Regarding the Judiciary and the Status of Judges” [in Ukrainian], Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine, March 11, 2020: <http://ccu.gov.ua/novyna/uhvaleno-rishennya-u-spravi-za-konstytuciynym-podannyam-verhovnogo-sudu-shchodo-sud
oustroyu?fbclid=IwAR0Ns7coxLvjnZY_BUW6AoNJkEswTwfRC_LMZUQPWxNT0Z6qacRSd37eJUs> (accessed April 29, 2020).
through the dismissal of judges who are disloyal to 
the government or keeping those who have integri-
ty issues.18
In March 2020, old guard judges made it clear that 
the system will not only not change from within, 
but it will also resist politicians’ attempts to change 
the status quo. On March 11, in response to a sub-
mission by the Supreme Court, the Constitution-
al Court of Ukraine (CC) ruled that most provisions 
of Zelenskyi’s law are unconstitutional.19 In February 
2020, the CC had already annulled parts of the judi-
cial reform of 2016 when it declared the liquidation 
of the former Supreme Court to be unconstitution-
al and restored the rights of the old guard judges. 
Some argue that, since 9 out of the 15 members of 
the CC were entrenched in the old legal establish-
ment, “the CC has a tendency to rule in favor of the 
THE KYIV DISTRICT 
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT: 
A SYMBOL OF JUDICIAL 
CORRUPTION
The Kyiv District Administrative Court (KDAC) 
is infamous for its controversial rulings and 
obstruction of the judicial reform process. Among 
the numerous decisions in its portfolio that have 
sparked public anger are the legitimization of the 
dispersal of peaceful protesters during the Rev-
olution of Dignity, the suspension of the duties 
of pro-reformist Acting Health Minister Uliana 
Suprun, the ruling that the nationalization of 
PrivatBank was illegal despite charges against it, 
and the blocking of investigations of high-profile 
corruption.
KDAC judges became the target of a corruption 
probe by NABU in July 2019. The investigation 
revealed that they used their connections to 
appoint politically loyal members to the HQCJ 
in order to bypass its mandatory qualification 
assessment. In early August 2019, the PGO 
pressed criminal charges against KDAC chairman 
Pavlo Vovk and two other judges. In connection 
to this, Vovk temporarily stepped down from the 
post, which he had occupied since 2010.
Soon afterwards, the HCJ rejected the prosecutor 
general’s motion to suspend Vovk from office 
during the ongoing criminal proceedings against 
him. Later, in November 2019, the court rejected 
the case that the PGO had prepared for trial, 
stalling the case indefinitely.
In January 2020, KDAC judges reelected Vovk as 
chairman. Vovk was reinstated to the KDAC just 
days after Ukraine’s parliament rejected important 
amendments that would have transferred several 
key competences of the ill-reputed institution to 
the Supreme Court – including the adjudication 
of disputes on the composition of the HQCJ, an 
important body for judicial reform. Ukrainian civil 
society lamented that Vovk’s comeback under such 
circumstances was a clear sign that the country’s 
corrupt judiciary is escaping reform.
Rule of Law Reform after Zelenskyi’s First Year
14 No. 4 | May 2020
ANALYSIS
incumbent judges and the ‘judicial corporation.’”20 In 
other words, the CC will almost always rule against 
any judicial reform that endangers its members’ in-
terests and positions. Moreover, the selection pro-
cess for CC judges also remains largely politicized. 
It is not clear whether the CC coordinated its deci-
sions with the office of the president, but it has ef-
fectively put an end to Zelenskyi’s attempt to reform 
the judiciary. Moreover, judicial developments on the 
ground midway through the first year of Zelenskyi’s 
tenure illustrate just how much the “old guard” is ca-
pable of preventing reform. Please see the info box 
on page 13 for a telling example provided by the Kyiv 
District Administrative Court. 
Rebooting the reform process would require bold-
er political vision accompanied by legislative actions 
as well as behavioral change on behalf of the judges 
themselves – in equal measure. Considering how re-
silient the judicial corporation is to reforming itself 
from within, the latter is currently highly unlikely. 
Anti-corruption Institutions:  
Under Growing Attacks
The reform and activity of anti-corruption institu-
tions during the first year of Zelenskyi’s presidency 
show positive, though not irreversible, results. The 
establishment of NABU in 2015 and the HACC in 2019 
were perhaps the most successful achievements of 
2014 to 2019. Both institutions, however, were set 
20 Mykhailo Zhernakov, “Judicial Reform in Ukraine: Stalled, Damaged, and Abandoned,” DEJURE Foundation, March 16, 2019: <http://en.dejure.foundation/
column/judicial-reform-in-ukraine-stalled-damaged-and-abandoned> (accessed May 1, 2020).
21 Sergii Leshchenko, “Vengeful politicians, worried oligarch join forces to destroy NABU,” Kyiv Post, April 29, 2020: <https://www.kyivpost.com/article/
opinion/op-ed/sergii-leshchenko-vengeful-politicians-worried-oligarch-join-forces-to-destroy-nabu.html> (accessed April 29, 2020).
up under heavy pressure from the West – especially 
due to IMF conditionality – rather than on the ini-
tiative of incumbent Ukrainian elites. Moreover, 
NABU’s future independence looks uncertain. It will 
also take more time for the HACC to hand down its 
first high-level convictions. In this regard, 2020 will 
be a test of the efficiency of the country’s newly es-
tablished anti-corruption system. 
As during Poroshenko’s presidency, NABU contin-
ues to experience pressure and attacks from politi-
cal and financial power groups with strong interests 
in preserving the old system. These include oligarch 
Ihor Kolomoisky who was not only under investiga-
tion by the SBI at that start of Zelenskyi’s presidency, 
but who is also backing a group of MPs in Zelenskyi’s 
own political party.21 Kolomoisky’s attempts to ex-
ert undue influence grew in 2019 and 2020. One ex-
planation for this increase is the greater threat that 
NABU poses now that it can work together with the 
HACC and cases are more likely to be reviewed and 
put on trial more quickly. At this point, more than 
400 cases have been submitted to the HACC and im-
portant high-level convictions and imprisonments 
could take place as early as 2020. Provided that cas-
es of selective justice will not occur, initial high-lev-
el imprisonments will be the most vivid indicators 
for society and the international community at large 
that the Ukrainian judiciary and law enforcement 
system is finally working. Financial interest groups, 
however, are not expected to simply observe this 
happening but rather use all of the informal tools of 
FIGURE 4 – NEGATIVE APPROVAL RATINGS, JANUARY 2020, IN %
Source: “Socio-political Moods of Population (January 22–26, 2020),” Sociological Group Rating, February 4, 2020
* Data from April 2020 published by Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on May 4, 2020 since not included in previous survey.
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control available to them to stifle change – including 
their influence on and from within the state institu-
tions themselves. 
In February and March, two bills were registered in 
the Rada aimed at amending the legislation on NABU 
in such a way that would weaken its independence 
and eventually enable the dismissal of its director, 
Artem Sytnyk. An overwhelming majority of MPs 
across several parliamentary factions, including the 
Servant of the People, signed those.22 In late April, 
one of the bills passed the preliminary approval by 
the relevant parliamentary committee.23 
Earlier, Sytnyk was accused and found guilty of tak-
ing an elite vacation, allegedly paid for by a busi-
nessman and friend. According to Sytnyk, he paid 
for the vacation himself, and the legal developments 
targeting him are related to two cases on which 
NABU was working. The first was a corruption case 
against the son of Minister of Internal Affairs Arsen 
Avakov, which was closed by the SAPO in 2018, 
22 “Draft resolution to dismiss NABU chief registered in Ukraine’s parliament,” UNIAN, February 8, 2020: <https://www.unian.info/politics/10865558-draft-
resolution-to-dismiss-nabu-chief-registered-in-ukraine-s-parliament.html> (accessed April 29, 2020).
23 Vitaliy Shabunin, “Dismissal of Sytnyk: how and why Kolomoisky, Avakov, and Poroshenko undermine agreement with IMF” [in Ukrainian], Ukrainska 
Pravda, April 28, 2020: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/columns/2020/04/28/7249737/> (accessed April 30, 2020).
24 “Avakov, Kolomoisky and 216 more troubles of Artem Sytnik. Interview with NABU Director” [in Ukrainian], Liga.net, February 12, 2020: <https://ua-news.
liga.net/politics/articles/avakov-kolomoyskiy-i-sche-216-nepriemnostey-artema-sitnika-intervyu-z-direktorom-nabu-4215811?fbclid=IwAR0wHuJTg_
AmtBc6jvip_NTKGjThi6YQlimDg3KfKi95V5aJ_-NEyEW24f4-> (accessed May 1, 2020).
25 Anti-Corruption Action Centre, “Law-Enforcement Committee of the Rada promotes illegal bill to dismiss Sytnyk, initiated by 
MPs controlled by Avakov and Kolomoisky” [in Ukrainian], ANTAC News, February 19, 2020: <https://antac.org.ua/news/pravookhoronnyy-komitet-rady-z-
initsiatyvy-deputativ-avakova-ta-kolomoys-koho-prosuvaienezakonnu-postanovu-pro-zvil-nennia-sytnyka/> (accessed May 1, 2020).
26 Anti-Corruption Action Centre, “Why dismissal of NABU director by the Parliament is a self-inflicted mistake. Legal explanation,” ANTAC News, February 
25, 2020: <https://antac.org.ua/en/news/dismissal-nabu-directoself-inflicted-mistake/> (accessed May 1, 2020).
allegedly due to insufficient incriminating evidence. 
The second is a case against oligarchs Kolomoisky 
and Gennadiy Boholyubov, the former owners of 
PrivatBank, Ukraine’s largest bank, which was na-
tionalized in 2016 after authorities discovered a $5.5 
billion hole in its ledgers. The case was completely 
transferred by the Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) 
to NABU in November 2019.24 Following the example 
of the first case that was closed without reaching tri-
al, the targets of the latter are also trying to get it 
dropped, undermining the investigation process by 
deploying resources to stall NABU’s activity, such as 
media pressure and undue influence over MPs. Anti- 
corruption experts believe that both the investiga-
tion and the ruling of the court in Sytnyk’s case are 
politically motivated.25 Moreover, they doubt that 
there are valid grounds for the subsequent proceed-
ings to initiate Sytnyk’s dismissal.26
Immediately after the first resolution was registered 
in parliament, the G7 Ambassadors in Ukraine sup-
ported NABU in a Twitter statement, warning against 
Source: “One Year of President Zelensky, Fighting the Coronavirus Pandemic, May Holidays and Political Ratings,” Kyiv International Institute of Sociology, 
May 19, 2020: <http://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=945&page=1> (accessed May 25, 2020).
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attempts to unlawfully remove its head.27 Later, a 
similar warning came from the IMF. A letter from the 
head of IMF’s mission to Ukraine, Ron van Roden, 
to the office of the president stated that dismissing 
Sytnyk or diluting NABU’s powers would jeopar-
dize the approval of a $5 billion lending program 
to Ukraine.28 President Zelenskyi’s ability to secure 
NABU’s institutional independence will be a key 
test of his political will and capacity to withstand 
domestic pressure in the fight against high-level 
corruption. 
One achievement has been the reshuffling of NAPC, 
the National Agency for the Prevention of Corrup-
tion. Under then President Poroshenko, the insti-
tution, which he helped establish in 2016, failed to 
perform well in checking the electronic asset decla-
rations of public officials. This resulted in the resig-
nation of some of its members, among them Ruslan 
Ryaboshapka in 2017. Ryaboshapka later served as 
Ukraine’s prosecutor general from August 2019 to 
March 2020. In December 2019, new leadership was 
selected for NAPC through a rigorous and transpar-
ent recruitment process. As a result of this achieve-
ment, USAID resumed its direct support of NAPC at 
the end of January 2020 – assistance that had previ-
ously been dropped due to NAPC’s poor institution-
al performance.29
Although it acted professionally in many instances, 
SAPO, the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s 
Office that is another of Ukraine’s institutional pil-
lars in fighting corruption, had become infamous for 
blocking investigations submitted by NABU, among 
other things. In March 2019, civil society activists, 
as well as then-US Ambassador to Ukraine Marie 
Yovanovitch, demanded the dismissal of SAPO’s head, 
Nazar Kholodnytsky. At that time, Hugues Mingarelli, 
who was serving as EU’s ambassador to Ukraine, also 
criticized Kholodnytsky for not cooperating proper-
ly with NABU, thus undermining its efforts to inves-
tigate corruption.30 Under the leadership of former 
prosecutor general Ruslan Ryaboshapka, however, 
27 Post on the Twitter account of the US Presidency of the G7 Ambassadors’ Support Group in Kyiv, February 10, 2020: <https://twitter.com/
G7AmbReformUA/status/1226796085433249792> (accessed May 1, 2020).
28 Jack Laurenson, “Business Update: April 29 – IMF warns that Ukraine government must protect NABU independence,” KyivPost, April 29, 2020: <https://
www.kyivpost.com/business/business-update-april-29-imf-warns-that-ukraine-government-must-protect-nabu-independence.html> (accessed May 1, 
2020).
29 Ivan Presniakov, Deputy Chairman of NAPC, Facebook post, January 31, 2020: <https://www.facebook.com/story.php?story_
fbid=10159018039408132&id=680853131&ref=content_filter> (accessed May 1, 2020).
30 Serhii Sydorenko, “EU Ambassador: I do not want to constantly say in Ukraine ‘corruption, corruption, corruption’” [in Ukrainian], European Truth, July 29, 
2019: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/interview/2019/07/26/7098936/> (accessed May 1, 2020).
31 “Avakov, Kolomoisky and 216 more troubles of Artem Sytnik. Interview with NABU Director” [in Ukrainian], Liga.net, February 12, 2020: <https://ua-news.
liga.net/politics/articles/avakov-kolomoyskiy-i-sche-216-nepriemnostey-artema-sitnika-intervyu-z-direktorom-nabu-4215811?fbclid=IwAR0wHuJTg_
AmtBc6jvip_NTKGjThi6YQlimDg3KfKi95V5aJ_-NEyEW24f4-> (accessed May 1, 2020).
32 Robyn Dixon and David L. Stern, “How Ukraine’s Zelensky lost the anticorruption movement,” Washington Post, March 17, 2020: <https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraine-corruption-zelensky-ryaboshapka-venediktova-trump-biden/2020/03/17/7dcab542-6636-11ea-912d-
d98032ec8e25_story.html> (accessed May 1, 2020). 
NABU and SAPO managed to improve their inter- 
institutional cooperation. In the second half of 2019 
alone, these institutions announced more corrup-
tion investigations than they had during all of 2018 
(84 versus 79).31
Because anti-corruption institutions have been a key 
focus of reforms after the Revolution of Dignity, they 
have finally started picking up the pace of their activ-
ity. Of the three institutions showing most progress 
at the moment, NABU is increasingly under strong 
attack. Whether these young anti-corruption insti-
tutions can continue to act independently and keep 
up the their new pace will be a key indicator of the 
government’s success in supporting the fight against 
corruption. Considering, however, that internation-
al partners such as the IMF are strongly backing 
NABU with stern warnings against the Rada’s bills 
aimed at dismissing Sytnyk, it might be impossible 
to determine whose success it would be to preserve 
NABU’s independence: President Zelenskyi’s, the 
IMF’s, or a combination of the two. 
The Office of the Prosecutor General:  
Reform Interrupted
For years, Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office 
(PGO) was a tool for repressing the regime’s oppo-
nents and an instrument of political games. The 
country’s least trusted institution, it hadn’t been re-
formed since Ukraine’s independence.32 Zelenskyi 
broke this vicious circle by appointing Ruslan 
Ryaboshapka, a prominent anti-corruption activ-
ist and professional, to be prosecutor general (PG) 
in August 2019. The Rada’s decision, in March 2020, 
to dismiss Ryaboshapka after a tenure of only seven 
months illustrates three main things: how resistant 
the old system is to change, how Zelenskyi favors 
loyalty over merit, and how the president’s power 
over his own parliamentary majority has faded away.
On September 25, 2019, Zelenskyi’s Law “On Urgent 
Measures to Reform the Country’s Prosecution Au-
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thorities” came into force.33 This law paved the way 
for replacing the PGO with the Office of the Pros-
ecutor General (OPG), a new institution. It also al-
lowed for prosecutors to be asked for reassessment 
through a merit-based and transparent process of 
computer testing and interview. Thus, a complete re-
shuffling of the prosecution system became possible.
By the end of 2019, the assessment process at the 
central level was completed and deemed successful. 
Of the 1,083 prosecutors who wished to go through 
the reassessment process (80 percent of all prosecu-
tors), only 610 (56 percent) passed. Thus, on January 
2, 2020, the new OPG started working with approx-
imately 1,500 employees, down from the 2,400 who 
had worked previously for the old PGO. Their sala-
ry also increased four fold – from UAH 7 thousand to 
29 thousand34 – making the job of prosecutor more 
attractive and financially sustainable. In 2020, re-
gional and local prosecutors are scheduled to un-
dergo the same reassessment process. It is expected 
that the overall number of prosecutors in the system 
will go down from 15,000 to 10,000, a number envis-
aged by the new law and considered more reason-
able. According to Ryaboshapka, Ukraine has one of 
the highest number of prosecutors per 100,000 peo-
ple in the world.35
The law introduced additional structural changes 
as well. For instance, military prosecution was dis-
mantled and two separate specialized departments 
were planned: one to deal with armed conflict, which 
has already been established, and the other to ad-
dress torture and other gross human rights viola-
tions, which is yet to come. Also, in November 2019, 
the prosecution lost the rights to open and conduct 
criminal investigations, having transferred them to 
the relevant pre-trial investigation authorities: SBI, 
NABU, SBU, and the National Police. Since then, 
prosecution authorities can only provide procedur-
al guidance in criminal proceedings.
33 The Law of Ukraine “On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine as to Urgent Measures to Reform the Prosecution Authorities,” Document 113-IX, adopted on 
September 19, 2019 (came into force on September 25, 2019): <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/113-20> (accessed May 5, 2020).
34 “Prosecutor’s Reform: Prosecutors’ Salaries of General Prosecutor’s Office Increased Compared to Prosecutors’ of the Liquidated GPU” [in Ukrainian], 
Office of the Prosecutor General, January 11, 2020: <https://www.gp.gov.ua/ua/news?_m=publications&_c=view&_t=rec&id=264480> (accessed May 1, 
2020).
35 Ukrainian Radio, “We will change the mentality of prosecutors: Ruslan Ryaboshapka on prosecution reform,” Interview in Ukrainian with 
Prosecutor General Ruslan Ryaboshapka, February 26, 2020: <http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/news.html?newsID=92794> (accessedMay 1, 2020).
36 Robyn Dixon and David L. Stern, “How Ukraine’s Zelensky lost the anticorruption movement,” Washington Post, March 17, 2020: <https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraine-corruption-zelensky-ryaboshapka-venediktova-trump-biden/2020/03/17/7dcab542-6636-11ea-912d-
d98032ec8e25_story.html> (accessed May 1, 2020). 
37 Vyacheslav Khripun, “Irina Venediktova: we will not be able to win in court cases following interviews with prosecutors” [in Russian], Sud, April 18, 2020:  
<https://sud.ua/ru/news/publication/166659-irina-venediktova-my-ne-smozhem-vyigrat-v-sudebnykh-sporakh-po-itogam-sobesedovaniy-s-prokurorami> 
(accessed May 1, 2020).
38 Post by the US Embassy in Kyiv, on behalf of the G7 Ambassadors’ Support Group in Kyiv, on the social media platform Twitter, March 3, 2020: <https://
twitter.com/USEmbassyKyiv/status/1234782739141931009> (accessed May 5, 2020).
39 “Zelensky about Prosecutor General Ryaboshapka: MPs vote, my opinion is that if there is no result – it should not take the place” [in Russian], Interfax, 
March 5, 2020: <https://interfax.com.ua/news/political/645223.html> (accessed May 1, 2020).
Although the law brought about the most sweep-
ing reform of Ukraine’s prosecution system in the 
country’s history,36 it has been criticized for being 
fully concentrated in the hands of the new prosecu-
tor general. Zelenskyi trusted Ryaboshapka and gave 
him carte blanche to carry out the reforms. While 
the integrity and professional record of Ryaboshapka 
and his deputies have never been questioned, the 
decision to remove the Qualification Disciplinary 
Commission from the process of selecting public 
prosecutors was considered problematic. The com-
mission had been established in 2014 and started its 
work in 2017. The law adopted in September 2019 en-
gaged external actors in the selection process in-
stead. Legal experts feared that many prosecutors 
who were removed through their reassessment by 
external actors would later be able to restore their 
positions in court, as had happened in the case of the 
national police (see below). Indeed, since the start of 
2020, 124 prosecutors who did not pass the last stage 
of selection – based on an interview and thus prone 
to subjectivity – brought their cases to court.37
Reforms initiated by Ryaboshapka were inter-
rupted by his dismissal on March 5 by a cross- 
party vote in parliament. His dismissal took place de-
spite recognition by the G7 Ambassadors to Ukraine 
of his substantial progress in reforming the OPG38; 
according to Ryaboshapka, it came without expla-
nation. President Zelenskyi, however, criticized 
him for the lack of progress on high-level cases.39 
With his removal of Ryaboshapka, Zelenskyi 
not only demonstrated that he prioritizes loyal-
ty of appointees over genuine independent institu-
tion-building, but that, by defying the pressure of the 
G7 Ambassadors, he is also better able to withstand 
international than domestic pressure.
On March 16, Iryna Venediktova, a former adviser 
to Zelenskyi and lawmaker from his party, was ap-
pointed the new PG. Her background and profile 
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are considered “unsuitable” for the position.40 She 
is expected to be fully loyal to and dependent on 
Zelenskyi, posing a real risk of politically motivat-
ed prosecutions. When Venediktova served as acting 
head of the SBI between December 2019 and March 
2020, she took some highly controversial steps (de-
tailed in the next section). In 2015, she failed to be 
appointed as judge of the Supreme Court when 
she scored less than the minimum required points. 
Soon after becoming PG, she removed Viktor Trepak 
who was heading the investigation of the Novem-
ber 2018 murder of anti-corruption activist Kateryna 
Handziuk and making progress.41 One month later, 
Venediktova’s deputy declared the investigation 
complete and redirected the case to the court. 
Ukraine’s human rights community stated that this 
decision was premature and aimed at acquitting 
the high-level official who allegedly ordered the 
murder.42
Reforming an institution that had not been ad-
dressed since independence is certainly complex, 
especially given the strong vested interests in pre-
serving the status quo. Still, President Zelenskyi’s ex-
pectation of immediate verdicts in high-profile cases 
and quest to maintain high approval ratings hint at 
his short-sightedness when it comes to deep struc-
tural change. Moreover, Zelenskyi’s motives con-
cerning Ryaboshapka are unclear. Did he appoint 
him believing more in his loyalty than his prospects 
40 Robyn Dixon and David L. Stern, “How Ukraine’s Zelensky lost the anticorruption movement,” Washington Post, March 17, 2020: <https://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ukraine-corruption-zelensky-ryaboshapka-venediktova-trump-biden/2020/03/17/7dcab542-6636-11ea-912d-
d98032ec8e25_story.html> (accessed May 1, 2020).
41 Halya Coynash, “Chief prosecutor in Handziuk murder investigation removed just as progress,” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, March 30, 2020: 
<http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1585360166> (accessed May 1, 2020).
42 Halya Coynash, “Handziuk murder: Ukraine’s Prosecutor General sabotages case against high-ranking suspect,” Human Rights in Ukraine, April 28, 2020: 
<http://khpg.org/en/index.php?id=1588024740> (accessed May 2, 2020).
43 Natlia Lebed, “Why State Bureau of Investigations didn’t become Ukraine’s FBI but swamped with scandals?”, 112 International, January 31, 2020: 
<https://112.international/ukraine-top-news/why-state-bureau-of-investigations-didnt-become-ukraines-fbi-but-swamped-with-scandals-48066.html> 
(accessed April 23, 2020). 
44 The Law of Ukraine “On Amending Certain Laws of Ukraine to Improve the Work of the State Bureau of Investigations,” Document 305-IX, adopted on 
December 12, 2019 (came into force on December 27, 2019): <https://zakon.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/305-20> (accessed May 5, 2020).
for successfully reforming such a corrupt institution? 
Did he have to sacrifice him as part of a larger pow-
er struggle with the Ukrainian oligarchs and region-
al political forces? What is certain is that Zelenskyi 
interrupted what was considered the most sweep-
ing reform in prosecution that Ukraine has experi-
enced to date, damaging his reputation as reformer 
both domestically and among international partners.
State Bureau of Investigations: In Limbo
President Zelenskyi also aimed to reboot the SBI, but 
his choice for its head did not inspire much hope. 
The SBI was created in 2017 to investigate the crimes 
of high-level officials, law enforcement authorities, 
police, and prosecutors (excluding corruption, which 
is the responsibility of NABU). However, its former 
leadership proved to be ineffective and there were 
complaints that the institution was “drowning in 
scandals.”43 
On December 3, 2019, the Rada adopted the Law “On 
the Optimization of the Work of the SBI,” which was 
proposed by President Zelenskyi to improve the ac-
tivity of the institution.44 It provided a change in its le-
gal status, gave the SBI director broader powers, and 
strengthened its parliamentary oversight. After the 
law came into force, its director, Roman Truba, was 
dismissed. Iryna Venediktova was then appointed SBI’s 
acting director by President Zelenskyi until a perma-
FIGURE 6 – TRUST IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS  
IN UKRAINE, DECEMBER 2019, IN %
Source: Public opinion poll of December 2019  
by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and  
the Razumkov Center
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nent one could be selected through a competitive 
merit-based process. During her short tenure at SBI, 
Venediktova officially announced that she favors abol-
ishing the law that grants amnesty to the 2014 Maidan 
protesters. She also launched an investigation of for-
mer President Poroshenko that Ryaboshapka had re-
fused because he considered it politically motivated 
and argued that evidence for such a case was miss-
ing. In addition, Venediktova filled two deputy posts 
through an opaque competition process.45
Importantly, the renewed SBI is in charge of inves-
tigating crimes committed during the Revolution of 
Dignity. It is worth noting that the employees who 
were working on cases related to the revolution at 
the old PGO when it was abolished were then moved 
to the SBI to work on them there. This was done so 
that institutional memory, as well as the work car-
ried out on those investigations so far, would be 
preserved – an important step as the risk of the in-
vestigations falling apart in the transfer process to 
other institutions was high. But one of the deputies 
recruited by Venediktova is a former lawyer of for-
mer President Yanukovych who was removed from 
office by 2014’s protests.
While Venediktova was directly responsible for all 
top appointments at SBI during her tenure as act-
ing director, it was President Zelenskyi who appoint-
ed her. At best, his choice signaled an increased risk 
of ineffectiveness. And now, with Zelenskyi having 
moved Venediktova to the post of prosecutor general 
in March, the SBI has been left in limbo until he ap-
points a new head. 
National Security Service: Reform Still to Come
Reforming the SBU is among the most urgent and 
challenging tasks that President Zelenskyi needs to 
undertake. With more than 32,000 employees and 
broad powers, including the investigation of financial 
violations, it currently poses a real threat to Ukraine’s 
business climate. In fact, 50 percent of foreign inves-
tors consider the repressive actions of SBU to be an 
obstacle to investment.46 Yet despite SBU’s impor-
45 Natlia Lebed, “Why State Bureau of Investigations didn’t become Ukraine’s FBI but swamped with scandals?”, 112 International, January 31, 2020: 
<https://112.international/ukraine-top-news/why-state-bureau-of-investigations-didnt-become-ukraines-fbi-but-swamped-with-scandals-48066.html> 
(accessed April 23, 2020).
46 Olena Shcherban, “Will Zelenskyi use historical chance to reform SBU: analysis of draft law of SBU,” AntAC, December 13, 2019: <https://antac.org.ua/en/
news/analysis-of-draft-law-of-sbu/> (accessed April 22, 2020). 
47 “The new draft law on the SBU reform preserves Soviet system of work,” Reanimation Package of Reforms, November 15, 2019: <https://rpr.org.ua/en/
news/the-new-draft-law-on-the-sbu-reform-preserves-soviet-system-of-work-2/> (accessed April 2, 2020).  
48 Petro Shevchenko, “Ze-Bureau. Why Ukraine has delayed implementation of IMF agreements and does not adopt a law on financial investigations” [in 
Ukrainian], Nv.ua, January 14, 2020: <https://nv.ua/ukr/biz/finance/prezident-volodimir-zelenskiy-virishiv-vzyati-pid-kontrol-byuro-finansovih-rozsliduvan-
novini-ukrajini-50063983.html> (accessed April 2, 2020). 
49 Maria Repko, “Banking Fragility Rooted in Justice Failures: Evidence from Ukraine,” CEPS, May 10, 2019: <https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/
banking-fragility-rooted-in-justice-failures/> (accessed May 5, 2020).
tance and the campaign promises of both Zelenskyi 
and his party, no reform has taken place to date.
In August 2019, Zelenskyi appointed Ivan Bakanov, his 
childhood friend and former head of his production 
studio, as the new head of SBU. Bakanov immedi-
ately made bold statements about imminent change 
and, in mid-October, presented a new draft law in-
tended to reset the SBU according to international 
standards. This draft law redefines the functions of 
SBU so that they do not overlap with other intelli-
gence agencies. It takes away SBU’s economic secu-
rity functions, optimizes its organizational structure, 
and foresees its demilitarization and depoliticization. 
Despite sounding encouraging, these provisions are 
not predicted to lead to systemic changes but rath-
er to “preserve the Soviet inheritance.” Instead of re-
forming SBU to European standards, which was the 
law’s declared intention, it tries to save the institu-
tion’s investigative powers and competences regard-
ing the fight against organized crime. Furthermore, 
some of the law’s proposed norms undermine the 
procedural independence of other law enforcement 
agencies and allow SBU to interfere in any criminal 
proceedings at its discretion.47
In addition to reforming SBU, the government also 
plans to create a separate institution, the Bureau of 
Financial Investigations (BFI). The establishment of 
such an institution is one of the priorities of IMF’s 
cooperation with Ukraine.48 If created, it will inves-
tigate all commercial economic crimes against the 
state. Until now, several institutions shared these 
competences: the ministry of internal affairs, which 
had dismissed its own department in charge of fi-
nancial crimes in September 2019; SBU; and the tax-
ation police. Experts argue that BFI will reduce tax 
pressure on entrepreneurs and improve Ukraine’s 
business climate.49 Equally important for BFI to be a 
truly independent institution, other bodies – fore-
most SBU – must simultaneously be deprived of their 
competence to investigate economic crimes. While 
the bill on BFI was approved by the Rada in its first 
reading in October 2019, it failed in its second read-
ing in January 2020. Although the president is ex-
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pected to submit a new bill on BFI, he has not yet 
done so.
The National Police: No Reform So Far
Despite high societal demand for reform of Ukraine’s 
law enforcement authorities and several attempts 
by the government, there has been only one re-
al achievement so far: the introduction of the road 
patrol police in 2015. This newly created institu-
tion, although formally a unit of the Ukraine’s nation-
al police, recruited and trained new personnel with 
the help of Western donors. Ninety-three percent of 
those hired came from outside the system.50
The national police was itself established in 2015. Al-
though the institution differs from its post-Soviet 
predecessor, it has hardly been reformed. The re-
newal of its personnel, by and large, failed. By 2018, 
92.3 percent of old staff had gone through a reas-
sessment process and was then taken over by the 
new police body. As for those who made up the 
7.7 percent that was fired, they were not only rein-
stated in their previous positions by the courts, but 
they also received more than €1.6 million in compen-
sation for their forced absence, draining the public 
budget.51
Effectively, all progressive initiatives within the po-
lice that were started in 2015 came to an end in 2016. 
Since then, there has been no political will to gen-
uinely reform the institution.52 Arguably, the main 
challenge that the national police must still address 
is the excessive influence of the minister of internal 
affairs. Due to reforms, the ministry of internal af-
fairs has formally become a body which no longer 
controls the work of five different institutions – the 
national police, state border guard service, migration 
service, national guard, and state service on emer-
gency situations – but merely coordinates and allo-
cates resources for them.53 In reality, however, things 
stand differently.
Under the leadership of the current minister of in-
ternal affairs, Arsen Avakov – who was appointed just 
50 Yevhen Zakharov, “Police Reform and Human Rights,” Kharkiv Human Rights Protection Group, July 3, 2017: <http://khpg.org/en/index.
php?id=1499110653> (accessed May 2, 2020).
51 Tetiana Goncharuk, “Where is Ukraine’s new police force?”, open Democracy, January 31, 2018: <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/where-is-
ukraines-new-police-force/> (accessed May 2, 2020).
52 Olena Makarenko, “Ukraine’s photogenic ‘new cops’ went viral, but the real police reform is yet to start,” Euromaidan Press, June 13, 2018: <http://
euromaidanpress.com/2018/06/13/ukraines-photogenic-new-cops-went-viral-but-the-real-police-reform-is-yet-tostart/> (accessed May 2, 2020).
53 Ibid. 
54 Anti-Corruption Action Center, “Avakov’s Octopus: As the ‘Interim Minister’ Increases Its Influence in the Power Bloc” [in Ukrainian], Ukrainian Pravda, 
January 28, 2020: <https://www.pravda.com.ua/articles/2020/01/28/7238587/> (accessed May 2, 2020).
55 “What is wrong with Avakov: high-profile crimes unveiled by police” [in Ukrainian], Slidstvo, February 23, 2020: <https://www.slidstvo.info/articles/shho-
ne-tak-z-avakovym-guchni-zlochyny-nerozkryti-politsiyeyu/> (accessed May 2, 2020).
after the Revolution of Dignity on February 22, 2014, 
and has remained in this position ever since, having 
survived four governments and two presidents – the 
ministry has become a very powerful institution, a 
“state within the state.”54 Avakov seems to have been 
responsible for sustaining the deficiencies of the na-
tional police in an attempt to maintain and increase 
his influence. Since 2014, none of the high-profile 
crimes committed against journalists and civil ac-
tivists have been properly investigated; nor have the 
crimes in which police officers were allegedly in-
volved.55 Despite the continuous demand by civ-
il society activists for Avakov’s removal, President 
Zelenskyi not only appointed him to serve in the gov-
ernment of Prime Minister Honcharuk, but also kept 
him in his second government under Prime Min-
ister Shmyhal. Zelenskyi’s decision could mean at 
least three things: he has no intention to genuinely 
reform Ukraine’s law enforcement system, he un-
derestimates the danger that the powerful minister 
poses to his authority and approval ratings, or he has 
struck a deal with Avakov in exchange for the securi-
ty services that he can provide.
SIGNPOSTS ON WHERE 
UKRAINE IS HEADING
A government’s commitment to conducting pain-
ful but necessary reforms is often measured by how 
much elites are willing to build strong institutions 
and curb entrenched vested interests. A litmus test 
for governments in democratizing societies such 
as Ukraine is whether they use their political pow-
er to help consolidate rule of law institutions. In the 
post-Soviet space, where nearly thirty years of tran-
sition have cemented the strength of vested inter-
ests, consolidation of rule of law is critical – not only 
for the democratic paths of the societies themselves, 
but also for the international community who can 
help support them and foreign investors who con-
sider investing in these countries.
Volodymyr Zelenskyi’s unprecedentedly high legit-
imacy and initial overwhelming majority in parlia-
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ment raised hopes, particularly among those who 
believe that a new Ukraine needs a radical rupture 
with its past and traditional politics. His election al-
so raised serious concerns among those segments 
who believe that a political novice with unclear ties 
to the old system is unable to change the country or 
is even dangerous for Ukraine’s statehood. One year 
into Zelenskyi’s presidency – with control lost over 
his SoP party in the Rada and reforms initiated that 
have disturbed the old system but not sufficient-
ly to change the status quo – Ukraine’s future is less 
bright even for those who trusted his capacity and 
political will to act. 
During the past year, civil society and the interna-
tional community witnessed several attempts to 
reboot parts of Ukraine’s system of rule of law in-
stitutions. While Zelenskyi’s decision to give a free 
hand to his newly appointed prosecutor general in 
August 2019 has transformed into one of the boldest 
reforms that the prosecution system has witnessed 
so far, his decision to let the judiciary reform itself 
from within with minor reform intervention brought 
less positive results. Considering the complexity of 
judicial reform amid the numerous challenges that 
Ukraine faces at the moment, it seems that it fell off 
the list of priorities. Judicial reform is, hence, cur-
rently stalled for an indefinite time.
Prosecution clean-up got interrupted. Zelenskyi has 
been unable or unwilling to protect Ryaboshapka’s 
course of reform of the prosecution system, and pre-
ferred replacing him with someone more loyal. With 
this decision, Ukraine has missed the opportunity of 
a lifetime to bring order to one of the most difficult 
sectors to reform. The newly appointed prosecutor 
general may not stand up to the magnitude of the 
challenge that the prosecution system is posing but 
this remains to be seen.
The effect of Zelenskyi’s tenure on Ukraine’s 
anti-corruption system is yet uncertain. The anti- 
corruption institutions that were established during 
Poroshenko’s presidency under strong pressure 
from domestic reform-minded constituencies and 
the international community are just starting their 
full-fledged activity. If these institutions are able 
to perform the duties well that they have been as-
signed, the years 2020 and beyond will bring major 
convictions. Their initial achievements have already 
put vested interests under severe stress. As a result, 
anti-corruption agencies are under strong attack 
56 Brian Bonner, “Riaboshapka: Zelensky Has Lost his Way,” UkraineToday.org, May 1, 2020: < https://ukrainetoday.org/2020/05/01/riaboshapka-zelensky-
has-lost-his-way/> (accessed May 5, 2020).
where they work. One test of Zelenskyi’s position on 
anti-corruption will be whether the current head of 
NABU will be sacked, a major concern for civil so-
ciety actors and the international community. Even 
if he is not, considering the inaction of the presi-
dent on the matter so far, this will most likely not be 
to Zelenskyi’s credit, but rather – yet again – due to 
pressure from international partners. 
Regarding the reform of law enforcement agencies, 
no major changes have been adopted or implement-
ed to date. Impartial investigations and convictions 
on cases of violence against civil society activists and 
journalists, as well as on those where police them-
selves are involved, have yet to take place. The pow-
er of the old guard is strengthening at the expense of 
the president’s capacity to defend the values and in-
stitutions of the rule of law, which are at the heart of 
consolidating Ukraine’s democratic transformation. 
As after the Revolution of Dignity, the old system has 
again proven actively resistant to change.
Consolidating rule of law is a complex process that 
takes a prolonged period of time, coordinated and 
consistent effort on behalf of multiple governments, 
and widespread pro-reform consensus among major 
stakeholders. The government reshuffle on March 4 
was a turning point for Zelenskyi’s presidency which 
wound up demonstrating that his capacity to de-
fend institutions and reforms when they need pro-
tection from the power groups opposing them is 
showing deep cracks. But according to his former pro- 
reform prosecutor general, Ruslan Ryaboshapka, who 
was ousted after the reshuffle, without presidential 
support “it’s not possible to establish rule of law” in 
Ukraine.56
Despite pushing forward many constructive provi-
sions in various laws (most of which can be credit-
ed to the established and readily available expertise 
of civil society), Zelenskyi failed to demonstrate the 
capacity or political will to enforce his and his team’s 
decisions and get them through the Rada. Also, his 
replacement of the government of Oleksyi Honcharuk 
after just six months in the office, showed that 
Zelenskyi has a highly populist approach that is guid-
ed by his approval ratings and lacks the vision and 
power to protect reforms from being hijacked by 
oligarchic interests. Moreover, with the reshuffle 
and particularly the dismissal of PG Ryaboshapka, 
Zelenskyi demonstrated that he prioritizes the 
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loyalty of appointees over genuine independent 
institution-building. 
Zelenskyi’s current political crisis becomes even 
more serious against the unfolding background of 
the effects of COVID-19. The president’s capacity to 
hold his party together and continue with govern-
mental reforms will be further undermined by the 
pandemic’s projected economic aftermath for 2020: 
a GDP decline of 5 percent and an unemployment 
rate of 9.4 percent of the labor force (1.5 million to 
2 million people).57 Addressing such dramatic hard-
ship will detract attention from other essential re-
forms. Consequently, there is a high risk that rule 
of law reform will be dropped as a priority during 
Zelenskyi’s presidency.
HOW INTERNATIONAL PARTNERS 
CAN FURTHER SUPPORT 
RULE OF LAW REFORM
While there is no official impact assessment of the 
overall external assistance provided to Ukraine since 
2014, this section is a modest attempt to provide an 
overview of which mechanisms worked and which 
did not over the past five years. It aims to help West-
ern development partners understand how they can 
further their support most effectively, particularly to 
promote rule of law reform in Ukraine. It concludes 
with a list of policy recommendations.
Western Assistance So Far
Since the 1990s, Ukraine has been part of various in-
ternational assistance programs and projects that 
target rule of law reform. When the launch of the Eu-
ropean Neighborhood Policy in 2004 and the signing 
of the EU-Ukraine Action Plan in 2005 mandated an-
nual progress reports, rule of law became an integral 
part of the EU-Ukraine bilateral agenda. The EU’s 
broader assistance between 1992 and 2013 helped to 
raise awareness of European rules and standards in 
Ukraine, but it had a minor impact on the function-
ing of state institutions.58 The EU had little leverage 
to make a real difference to the effectiveness of the 
governance process. While the IMF was also an im-
portant actor, no conditionality was attached to rule 
of law reforms before 2014. 
57 Jack Laurenson, “Business Update – March 30: GDP to shrink, unemployment increases, banks vulnerable,” KyivPost, March 30, 2020: <https://www.
kyivpost.com/business/business-update-march-30-gdp-to-shrink-unemployment-increases-banks-vulnerable.html> (accessed May 2, 2020).
58 Kataryna Wolczuk and Darius Zeruolis, “Rebuilding Ukraine. An Assessment of EU Assistance,” Research Paper, Chatham House (August 2018): <https://
reader.chathamhouse.org/rebuilding-ukraine-assessing-eu-assistance-ukraine#> (accessed May 2, 2020).
59 Eszeter Zalan, “EU divided on how to protect rule of law,” EUobserver, September 16, 2019: <https://euobserver.com/political/145957>  
(accessed May 2, 2020).
The EU is divided on how to protect the rule of law 
inside its own member states, as the cases of Hun-
gary and Poland have shown.59 Moreover, it has no 
bluebook for what constitutes “a right path for re-
form” to establish and consolidate the rule of law 
– although it has frequently expected its eastern 
partners, including Ukraine, to produce one domes-
tically. At other times, the EU has been criticized 
for being over prescriptive to others when it lacks 
a blueprint itself and faces serious rule of law chal-
lenges of its own domestically. The EU has, however, 
learned from its experience with past enlargement 
waves in Central and Eastern Europe and, today, it 
applies some of those lessons farther east. Yet, after 
Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity, it mostly relied on 
conditionality measures related to anti-corruption 
and more abstract criteria applied to rule of law re-
form without specific benchmarks or performance 
indicators. Having no benchmarks for rule of law re-
form makes it almost impossible to objectively as-
sess progress and leaves space for interpretation and 
politicization of the process both in Ukraine and the 
EU’s capitals. 
On the other hand, there are instruments that work 
and need to be continued and further improved. 
Here, we look at the positive role of conditionality, 
assistance, and political engagement and diplomat-
ic pressure.
First, the financial and political conditionality tools 
of the IMF and EU have played key roles in encour-
aging difficult and, sometimes, what seemed to be 
unacceptable reforms for certain powerful domes-
tic actors. The approval and disbursement of loans 
have been the IMF’s major instruments, while the 
EU’s, so far, has been the Visa Liberalisation Action 
Plan (VLAP). In both cases, corruption-related con-
ditionality measures have been the most common in 
the past, while issues such as judicial reform received 
much less attention.
With its approval of visa-free travel for Ukraini-
ans in 2017, the EU is considered to have exhausted 
one of its most important instruments for push-
ing rule of law reforms in the country. The EU’s fi-
nancial conditionality has also played a role since, 
most prominently, its three programs of Macro-Fi-
nancial Assistance (MFA) that have been in effect 
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since 2014 included legislative and institutional anti- 
corruption benchmarks. In late 2017, Ukraine lost 
an MFA tranche of €600 million because it failed to 
meet several anti-corruption conditions. 
Both the IMF and the EU’s VLAP conditionality con-
tributed to important achievements. These include 
the establishment of NABU and its independent and 
effective operation, the establishment of SAPO and 
the transparent selection process of its director, the 
establishment of HACC and its competitive selection 
process of judges, the establishment of NACP and the 
introduction of the electronic declaration of assets 
(although there have been problems with verifica-
tion), the adoption of legislation on asset-recovery, 
greater transparency in public procurement, and 
transparency of funding for political parties.60 It is 
equally true that the EU’s conditionality mechanisms 
have sometimes encouraged box ticking during the 
adoption process of anti-corruption laws and have 
had a less consistent impact on their implementa-
tion. Conditionality was only possible once Ukraine’s 
major Western development partners, along with 
strong civil society constituencies, understood the 
importance of rule of law reform. 
Second, a number of successful innovations to the 
partners’ assistance approach have been intro-
duced since 2014. These include the creation of a spe-
cial Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA) and of the 
EU Advisory Mission for Civilian Security Sector Re-
form under the CSDP track. The SGUA’s coordination 
and planning of assistance have focused on devel-
oping an approach that embraces whole sectors. In 
contrast, assistance before 2014 consisted of a large 
number of individual projects.61 The SGUA has also 
helped the EU better coordinate its efforts with that 
of other international donors. In addition, a donor co-
ordination platform led by the EU Delegation on the 
ground works toward avoiding overlaps and chan-
neling broader development assistance efforts more 
effectively.
Another innovation is the strategic focus on the re-
form-oriented dimension of EU policies. Rule of law 
has received important attention in the new form 
60 Anti-Corruption Action Center, “Map of Anticorruption Conditionality by AntAC”: <https://map.antac.org.ua/> (accessed May 1, 2020).
61 Kataryna Wolczuk and Darius Zeruolis, “Rebuilding Ukraine. An Assessment of EU Assistance,” Research Paper, Chatham House (August 2018): <https://
reader.chathamhouse.org/rebuilding-ukraine-assessing-eu-assistance-ukraine#> (accessed May 1, 2020).
62 See details about this project here: <https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine_en/49261/EU%20Anti-Corruption%20Initiative%20in%20Ukraine> 
(accessed May 2, 2020).
63 “Remarks by Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Olivér Várhelyi after the EU-Ukraine Association Council,” European Commission, 
January 28, 2020: <https://ec.europa.eu/commission/commissioners/2019-2024/varhelyi/announcements/remarks-commissioner-neighbourhood-and-
enlargement-oliver-varhelyi-after-eu-ukraine-association_en> (accessed May 3, 2020). 
64 See more specific examples of political engagement and diplomatic pressure in Dmytro Shulga, “The EU as a promoter of accountable governance: the 
case of Ukraine,” unpublished paper, January 2020.
of EU assistance to Ukraine – the “delegated agree-
ments,” which are resource programs implemented 
by development agencies of EU member states. Thus, 
in 2017, a €16 million anti-corruption program was 
launched that was implemented by Denmark’s devel-
opment agency.62 Several other programs have been 
launched as well, including the Support Rule of Law 
Reforms in Ukraine (PRAVO) for judiciary and law en-
forcement. Altogether, the EU and its member states 
have allotted €17 billion in assistance to Ukraine 
since 2014.63
Finally, political engagement and diplomatic pres-
sure on the ground have also shown positive re-
sults. This is where the EU has significantly improved 
its performance over the years. EU Ambassadors to 
Ukraine Jan Tombinski and Hugues Mingarellli, who 
served from 2012 to 2019, did not shy away from 
commenting on bills, appointments, and processes 
during the period when most anti-corruption insti-
tutions were created. The EU has also directly par-
ticipated in anti-corruption reform implementation: 
its delegates worked in commissions that selected 
the heads of NABU and HACC, having contributed 
to the independence and higher professional quality 
of the selection results.64 It is also worth mentioning 
the positive role of the Ukraine Support Group with-
in the Group of Seven (G7), which has come up with a 
number of political statements on reforms in Ukraine 
and, less publicly, has met with various key actors in 
the reform process. With these, it has proved to be 
an important promoter of reforms in Ukraine.
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Recommendations
The remainder of President Zelenskyi’s term will be 
primarily defined by how Ukraine responds to the 
humanitarian and economic effects of the COVID-19 
pandemic. Depending on the magnitude of conse-
quences, there may be space for maintaining the 
course of reforms that Ukraine embarked on after 
the Revolution of Dignity, but this will likely be fur-
ther undermined by the fragmentation of Zelenskyi’s 
power and capacity to push legislation in the Rada. 
This space will also be defined by Russia’s goals to-
wards its neighbor, the strength of the fight that fi-
nancial power groups within Ukraine are ready to 
engage in to maintain their influence, the demand 
for reform that is building up inside the country it-
self, and, last but not least, the pressure that the in-
ternational community is ready to apply. 
International partners and donors are key players in 
terms of their ability to influence the course of re-
forms in Ukraine. The EU, in particular, has a unique 
ability to externally influence the domestic transfor-
mation of Ukraine that is based on its positive image 
and wide societal support for European integration. 
To keep political elites engaged in rule of law re-
form, as well as to discourage reversing the reforms 
already undertaken, the international community 
needs to take the following actions:
1.  Prioritize rule of law reformThe EU has managed to actively drive anti-cor-
ruption reform in Ukraine since 2014, but it has rath-
er modestly supported the prioritization of reforms 
of the judiciary, prosecution, and law enforcement. 
As a result, there was no substantial progress in re-
forming law enforcement agencies, particularly the 
SBU, the landmark component of security sector re-
form. These institutions are equally important for a 
successful fight against corruption and, consequent-
ly, require a complete overhaul. Together with other 
international partners such as the IMF, the EU needs 
to prioritize reform of the judiciary and other rule of 
law sectors mentioned in this analysis.
2.  Condition funding on rule of law performanceRule of law reform priorities need to become 
part of EU conditionality, for instance in future MFA 
programs that the EU negotiates with Ukraine, as 
well as part of conditionality for IMF funds. One step 
in the right direction is the comment by the IMF’s 
managing director on the importance of an indepen-
65 Mykhailo Zhernakov, “Judicial Reform in Ukraine: stalled, damaged, and abandoned,” DEJURE Foundation, March 16, 2019: <http://en.dejure.foundation/
column/judicial-reform-in-ukraine-stalled-damaged-and-abandoned> (accessed May 1, 2020).
dent judiciary for the disbursement of its loan pack-
age referred to above. This seems to be the first time 
that the IMF has named the independence of the ju-
diciary as one of the objectives that need to be ful-
filled in relation to a financial support program.65
3.  Develop tools for objective performance  assessment
While there are no predefined benchmarks for per-
formance assessment in the rule of law area, the EU 
did develop several tools to assess its member states’ 
performance in this field. The EU currently uses the 
EU Justice Scoreboard for the regular assessment of 
the state of the judiciary in its member states, and it 
is currently working to develop the EU’s future Rule 
of Law Mechanism. This mechanism is expected to 
replace the EU Justice Scoreboard and the EU An-
ti-Corruption Report, which assesses the state of 
the fight against corruption. The question is wheth-
er the EU could also apply the tools it uses for inter-
nal assessment to countries like Ukraine. In 2018, the 
Ukrainian government officially proposed that the 
EU develop a new Agenda in the area of Freedom, 
Justice, and Security (issues covered in Title III of the 
EU-Ukraine Association Agreement). Negotiations on 
the content of the draft proposal that Ukraine sub-
mitted are still ongoing. Considering the interest of 
Ukrainian authorities and in order to improve the ef-
fectiveness of EU assistance to reforms, as well as to 
identify priorities and benchmarks for providing fur-
ther assistance, the EU should use the same assess-
ment tools to measure progress reform in Ukraine.
4.  Tie assistance to implementationImplementation is where even the most ad-
vanced institutional reforms currently lag behind. In 
addition, this is the phase where many reforms stall 
altogether and no tangible results reach citizens. In-
ternational partners should also tie their assistance 
to the implementation phase by granting longer pe-
riods and more active guidance for implementa-
tion. This should include more detailed elaboration 
and specification of implementation benchmarks to 
help embed the adopted reforms and avoid simple 
box ticking. Moreover, it could define new directions 
for subsequent assistance based on the deficiencies 
identified during the reform assessment process.
5. Continue supporting successful reform tools So far, the “sandwich model” of reform, in 
which international partners work closely with civ-
il society experts and other reform-minded constit-
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uencies in Ukraine to push for reform, has proven 
successful along with other innovative initiatives 
such as the Brussels-based SGUA. Moreover, political 
engagement and diplomatic pressure (through the 
EU Delegation in Kyiv) to promote coordinated mes-
saging with reform minded-constituencies on the 
ground in Ukraine, as well as the further coordina-
tion of assistance provided by Ukraine’s development 
partners, should be preserved and strengthened. The 
EU also needs to conduct a transparent and objective 
assessment of its assistance approach and the tools 
it already employs to encourage reform in a more ef-
fective manner by redirecting funds to programs that 
work and making cuts to the programs and institu-
tions that have little or no impact. 
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